We study issues of robustness in the context of Quantitative Risk Management and Optimization. Depending on the underlying objectives, we develop a general methodology for determining whether a given risk measurement related optimization problem is robust.
Introduction
The main focus of this paper is the study of robustness properties of optimization procedures within Quantitative Risk Management (QRM) . For this, we introduce a novel general framework, which at the same time is conceptually intuitive and mathematically challenging. A key and, as we will highlight in the paper, novel, question concerns the influence of the choice of the underlying objective on the resulting robustness properties in risk optimization. In particular, we are interested in the two most popular regulatory risk measures, the Value-at-Risk (VaR) and the Expected Shortfall (ES), and their robustness properties in the context of risk optimization.
In QRM, the concept of robustness for risk measures is traditionally studied at the level of objective functionals without involving optimization problems; see Cont et al. (2010) , Kou et al. (2013) , Krätschmer et al. (2014 Krätschmer et al. ( , 2017 , , and the references therein. In the literature on robust optimization (see e.g. Ben-Tal et al. (2009) ), model uncertainty is typically incorporated through modifying the objective functional or the constraints.
Our setup is different from the above perspectives; it builds on the simple observation that a risk measure as a standalone function may be robust, but fail to have desirable robustness properties when this measure is used within an optimization context. To briefly illustrate our ideas, suppose that a risk factor is represented by a random variable X arising from a stochastic model, later in the paper, X will denote a random vector. An investor has to optimize her position according to the best of her knowledge, and hence we shall refer to X as the best-ofknowledge model, and the true model, denoted by Z, is typically unknowable. Ideally, a good model X is close to Z in a sense to be made clear later. Based on the best-of-knowledge model X and an objective functional ρ, an optimized position is chosen as a function g(X) of X. Whereas the position g(X) may have a desirable objective value ρ(g(X)), this does not guarantee that ρ(g(Z)) is also desirable if Z is "slightly" different from X. In the absence of a perfect model, which almost always is the case in financial applications, this issue becomes crucially important.
In the present paper, we put this observation into a rigorous quantitative framework.
The paper Cont et al. (2010) compares the qualitative robustness of VaR and coherent risk measures; the authors conclude that VaR is better in their context. Some later papers, e.g. and Krätschmer et al. (2014 Krätschmer et al. ( , 2017 , put the corresponding arguments into a different perspective, showing that ES also has certain desirable robustness properties. Both streams of research assumed that both VaR and, say, ES are applied to the same financial position. In reality, however, the regulatory choice of a particular risk measure creates certain incentives, just like any other aspect of regulation. These incentives become effective even before that risk measure has ever been applied in a risk management context. For instance, once a specific risk measure has been chosen, portfolios will be optimized with respect to that risk measure. Thus, in reality, VaR and ES will will typically not be applied to the same position.
Therefore, one cannot decouple the technical properties of a chosen risk measure from the incentives it creates. In our current paper, we make a first attempt of taking the effects created by such incentives into account. As an important, and perhaps somewhat surprising consequence, we arrive at completely different conclusions concerning robustness properties than the previous literature.
The contribution and the structure of the paper are outlined below. In Section 2, we introduce the theoretical framework of robustness properties of risk measures in the context of optimization problems, referred to as 'robustness in optimization' throughout the paper. The framework is quite general and it includes many practical problems in various fields of applications, not necessarily confined to finance and insurance. In Section 3, some preliminary results connecting robustness and continuity are presented. Keeping the problem of risk measures in mind, several representative optimization problems are listed in Section 4. As one of our contributions, we provide analytical solutions to these optimization problems in Sections 5 and 6 for VaR and ES, respectively. From our results, we shall see that, indeed, for the case of VaR which is argued by many as a robust risk measure, its corresponding optimization is highly non-robust and a small model uncertainty would ruin the optimality of the optimized positions. For the case of ES the optimized positions are generally robust. In Section 7, we present some discussions on the implications of our results for the desirability of specific regulatory risk measures, an ongoing debate in the financial industry (BCBS (2016) , IAIS (2014)). Our results yield a (further) strong argument against using VaR as a risk measure within banking and insurance regulation; for a related discussion on robustness in the realm of risk sharing, see Embrechts et al. (2018) . In the last section, Section 8, we discuss our notion of robustness in the context of distributionally robust optimization (e.g. Natarajan et al. (2008) , Goh and Sim (2010) ). The proofs of all results are put in the appendix.
Theoretical framework 2.1 Notation
We work with an atomless probability space (Ω, F , P). Let L q be the set of all random variables in (Ω, F , P) with finite q-th moment, q ∈ (0, ∞), L 0 be the space of all P-a.s. finite random variables, and L ∞ the set of all essentially bounded elements of L 0 . For a positive integer n, write L q n = (L q ) n . For a vector x ∈ R n , |x| is its Euclidean norm. Throughout, for any X ∈ L 0 , F X represents the distribution function of X. The mappings ess-inf(·) and ess-sup(·) on L 0 stand for the essential infimum and the essential supremum of a random variable, respectively. We write X d = Y if the random variables X and Y have the same distribution under P. For x ∈ R, denote by δ x the point-mass probability measure at x.
Basic setup of optimization problems
In this section, we first lay out the basic setup for optimization problems when the relevant information on the underlying economic model is known precisely, that is, the case without model uncertainty. Let X be an n-dimensional random vector, where n is a positive integer.
The random vector X is called an economic vector, which includes all random sources in an economic model under study, such as potential losses, traded securities, hedging instruments, insurance contracts, macro economic factors, or pricing densities. Let G n be the set of measurable functions mapping R n to R. A random variable g(X) where g ∈ G n represents a risky position of an investor, in which positive values represent a loss and negative values represent a gain. This sign convention is in line with the regulatory angle we follow in several applications in our paper. The investor's problem is to choose among admissible positions g(X) for some functions g in an admissible set G ⊂ G n .
For a set G ⊂ G n , we formulate the problem to minimize: ρ(g(X)) subject to g ∈ G,
where ρ is an objective functional mapping a set containing {g(X) : g ∈ G} to R ∪ {+∞}. Here one prefers a smaller value of the objective functional over a larger value. Objective functionals considered may be general; examples include (up to a sign change) mean-variance functionals, expected utilities, rank-dependent utility functionals, functionals in cumulative prospect theory, and various risk measures as discussed in Artzner et al. (1999) and Föllmer and Schied (2016) .
Our main interest will be, however, in the risk measures Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES 1 ).
The elements in the optimization problem (1) can be summarized by an objective functional ρ and a pair (X, G). We always assume that the domain of the objective functional ρ contains {g(X) : g ∈ G}, otherwise (1) is meaningless.
Example 1. An illustrative example is the classic problem of hedging in a financial market.
Suppose that an investor currently faces a risk W and would like to hedge against W . She 1 A formal definition of VaR and ES is given in Section 4. ES is also known as CVaR, CTE, AVaR and TVaR, depending on the context (see e.g. Pflug and Werner (2007) , McNeil et al. (2015) and Föllmer and Schied (2016) ). We use the term ES to be consistent with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS (2016)), because our study is motivated by the comparative advantages of VaR and ES in regulation; see discussions in Section 7.
has access to hedging instruments in a set {g(Y ) : g ∈ G ′ } where Y is an (n − 1)-dimensional economic vector and, say, G ′ ⊂ G n−1 , n 2. Typically, the set G ′ involves a budget constraint.
Equivalently, she chooses risky positions in the set {W − g(Y ) : g ∈ G ′ }, which represents all possible hedged positions she may attain. Note that
is an n-dimensional random vector and
therefore the hedging problem is a special case of our general setting (1). Here we allow W to be arbitrarily dependent on Y . If W is a financial risk and Y is the vector of asset prices in a complete financial market, then it may be that W is a function of Y . On the other hand, if W represents a property and casualty insurance risk and Y is the vector of asset prices in a financial market, then it may be reasonable to assume that W and Y are independent. See Remark 6 for a discussion on how a set of more specific optimization problems can be interpreted within the context of a complete market model with d assets in continuous time.
Example 2. In Markowitz portfolio selection, a investor wishes to find an optimal allocation vector w ∈ R n based on a return vector Y ∈ L 2 n for n stocks. The problem can be described as the minimization of E[g(Y )] where g ∈ G ′ and G ′ consists of all functions g ∈ G n that are of the form g(y) = λ(w ⊤ y) 2 − w ⊤ y for w ∈ R n satisfying n i=1 w i = x 0 . Here, λ > 0 is a risk-aversion parameter and x 0 represents the budget constraint of the investor.
In this paper, we keep the choice of (X, G) as generic as possible. Some special cases and examples are studied in Sections 4-6.
Remark 1. One can also consider continuous-time models where optimizers are chosen over a set of stochastic processes (e.g. admissible trading strategies). Our discussions apply to such problems, as long as the optimizers are functions of the random source X, be it finite dimensional or infinite dimensional. In fact, in many classic financial models, the continuous-time optimization problem (such as the hedging example above) can be translated into a single-period optimization problem via the martingale approach; see Föllmer et al. (2009) . For the sake of simplicity, we will focus in this paper on the case of optimization over functions of finite dimensional vectors.
Uncertainty and robustness in optimization
We proceed to put uncertainty into the optimization problem (1) described above. For X ∈ L 0 n , G ⊂ G n and an objective functional ρ, denote by ρ(X; G) the minimum possible value of ρ, namely, ρ(X; G) = inf{ρ(g(X)) : g ∈ G}, and by G X (ρ) the set of optimizing functions, that is,
(2)
Note that G X (ρ) might be an empty set. Throughout this paper, the notation g X will refer to a generic element g X ∈ G X (ρ), and g X (X) will be called an optimized position.
We shall use the random variable X to represent our (perceived) model for the underlying economic vector. In practice, the model X is obtained based on stochastic assumptions and statistical inference, and it may not represent a true model for the underlying economic vector.
In other words, the optimization problem (1) is often subject to severe model uncertainty. To reflect this issue, let Z ⊂ L 0 n be a set of possible economic vectors including X; Z may be interpreted as the set of alternative models 2 . Suppose that the real economic vector Z ∈ Z is different from the perceived economic vector X. The information we have at hand is about X rather than Z, and we shall refer to X as the best-of-knowledge model and Z as the true model, which is unknowable. We have to make decisions according to the best of our knowledge, that is, as in (2), choosing g X ∈ G X (ρ) optimizing our objective ρ. The real real but unknown position g X (Z) may be different from the perceived optimal position g X (X). If Z and X are close to each other according to some (pseudo-)metric π (e.g. L ∞ -metric on the space of bounded random vectors), we would like ρ(g X (Z)) to be close to ρ(g X (X)) in order to make sense of the position g X (Z), which may no longer be optimal. In other words, we naturally would desire some continuity of the mapping Y → ρ(g X (Y )) at Y = X.
Note that, in our situation, there is no point in analyzing the problem of optimizing g(Z) over g ∈ G, because Z is unknown. This makes our framework conceptually different from the stream of research on stability of the set of optimizers under model uncertainty; see Remark 2 below for an example from financial regulation where we explicit this very important distinction between our paper and other approaches in the literature.
Putting this into the hedging context of Example 1, suppose that the real economic vector Z ∈ Z is different from X and an investor has the real risk f (Z) to hedge where f ∈ G. The information she has is about X, and she hedges from a set of instruments G ′ ⊂ G. In this case,
is the remaining risk she actually faces after hedging. Under this setting, assuming the quality of model X is good, Z should be close to X in some sense, and she would naturally
2 For instance, Z can be a parametric family of risk models and hence corresponds to parameter uncertainty of the underlying risk models. Each component of the vector X may have a different economic meaning. Some of them may be subject to more severe model uncertainty whereas others may be free of model uncertainty. This can be reflected in the choice of Z which may be contained in a low-dimensional subset of the set of n-random vectors.
We also note that, in our framework, the admissible set G is not subject to model uncertainty; the investor knows which positions she can choose in the optimization problem. For instance, in the above hedging example, a budget constraint that determines G is not affected by the model assumptions made for X; it is simply the observed prices for the hedging instruments.
In light of the above consideration, we endow the set Z of all possible economic vectors with a pseudo-metric π. Below we give three prominent examples of π, which will appear throughout the paper.
(ii) For q ∈ [1, ∞) and a subset Z of L q n , the L q -metric π q n is defined as
(iii) For a subset Z of L 0 n , the pseudo-metric π W n is defined as
where π P is the Prokhorov metric over the set of probability distribution measures 3 . In this case, convergence in π W n is equivalent to convergence in distribution (or weak convergence).
The reason of considering a pseudo-metric instead of a metric is to be able to incorporate cases such as (5) for objective functionals based on the distributions of risks, for instance, law-invariant risk measures.
Definition 1. We call (G, Z, π) an uncertainty triplet if G ⊂ G n and (Z, π) is a pseudo-metric space of n-random vectors. For a given uncertainty triplet (G, Z, π), we say that an objective
) for all g ∈ G and Y, Z ∈ Z with π(Y, Z) = 0, i.e. Y and Z are indistinguishable under the pseudo-metric π.
Definition 2. Let (G, Z, π) be an uncertainty triplet. A compatible objective functional ρ is robust at X ∈ Z relative to (G, Z, π) if there exists g X ∈ G X (ρ) such that the function
In this paper, the concept of robustness is always in the sense of Definition 2 and it should not be confused with the classic qualitative robustness as studied in e.g. Cont et al. (2010) , Kou et al. (2013) , Krätschmer et al. (2014) and . On the other hand, in contrast to the robust optimization literature (e.g. Goh and Sim (2010) , Wiesemann et al. (2014) ), our focus is the robustness of objective functionals in optimization, instead of how to solve particular optimization problems. For this, we do not assume specific properties (e.g. convexity) of the objective functionals. As such, our setup and methodology are also different from classic ones in the optimization literature.
We make a few immediate observations about Definition 2. Robustness is a joint property of (ρ, X, G, Z, π), and only a π-neighbourhood of X in Z matters in the definition. If ρ is robust at X relative to (G, Z, π), then ρ is also robust at X relative to (G, Z ′ , π) if X ∈ Z ′ ⊂ Z, and the same holds true for (G, Z, π ′ ) if π ′ is a stronger pseudo-metric than π. On the other hand, if the optimization problem does not admit a solution, that is, G X (ρ) = ∅, then ρ is not robust at X.
Remark 2. Let us comment on the relations between our definition of robustness and related notions in the literature on optimization and model uncertainty. To this end, we consider the problem of solvency capital calculation of a firm as set forth in the Basel III/IV and Solvency II agreements. Suppose that Z is the true (but unknown) model and g Z ∈ G Z (ρ); see (2) with X = Z. In solvency capital calculation, the following quantities have different physical meanings:
• ρ(g X (X)): the perceived risk value (solvency capital requirement) optimized for X by the firm;
• ρ(g Z (Z)): the idealistic risk value optimized for Z as if Z were known;
• ρ(g X (Z)): the actual risk value of the model Z, but the optimization is made for X.
Among the above quantities, the idealistic risk value ρ(g Z (Z)) represents what would be the best-case if the true model were known. Since the true model is not known, this value is not available and hence irrelevant for the solvency capital calculation. Therefore, for solvency risk management purposes, we are interested in the solvency gap
not the optimality gap
nor the optimality shift
Note that both (7) and (8) involve ρ(g Z (Z)) which is not relevant for solvency considerations.
In the optimization literature, the continuity of the set mapping Z → G Z (ρ), as well as that of the function Z → ρ(g Z (Z)), is referred to as the problem of stability, i.e. how do the optimal solutions and the optimality shift (8) change when the underlying model changes from X to Z;
see, e.g., Bonnans and Shapiro (2000) and the references therein.
Let us further illustrate our notion of robustness by means of the following two examples.
Example 3. Suppose that the model X leads to the unique optimal decision g X (x) = x 0 ∈ R, which means fully liquidating this asset or a perfect hedge (such a situation will arise, e.g., in the context of Proposition 6). In this case, g X is a constant function, and hence Z → ρ(g X (Z)) is a constant mapping, thus always robust according to our definition. In other words, the solvency gap (6) will be zero, no matter what the optimizer for the true risk Z is. Hence, model uncertainty is irrelevant for the calculation of the solvency capital. On the other hand, if the true model Z is not equal to X and liquidating the asset is not optimal for Z, then we have ρ(g Z (Z)) < x 0 ; thus the optimality shift (8) will be strictly negative. Therefore, the solvency gap in (6) is the right notion to look at in this scenario, not the optimality shift.
Example 4. Suppose that X and Z are similar in the sense that g X (X) and g Z (Z) are identically distributed, but g X (Z) and g X (X) are not identically distributed. In this case, we have ρ(g X (X)) = ρ(g Z (Z)) for any law-invariant risk measure ρ, such as VaR p or ES p , but ρ(g X (Z)) > ρ(g Z (Z)) = ρ(g X (X)) since g X is generally not optimal for Z. Clearly, the solvency gap (6) is strictly positive and the optimality shift (8) vanishes. In this situation, the regulator is concerned about the insolvency issue regarding model uncertainty. Indeed, the true risk value ρ(g X (Z)) is larger than the perceived risk value ρ(g X (X)), which means that the solvency capital is insufficient. Note however that there is no gap between ρ(g Z (Z)) and ρ(g X (X)). Therefore, also here, the solvency gap is the right notion to study rather than the optimality gap.
Remark 3. There are some alternative ways to formulate the notion of robustness in Definition 2. For instance, one may use topologies instead of metrics, or use uncertainty on the set of probability measures instead of that on the set of random vectors. By choosing appropriate metrics and topologies, these formulations become equivalent. To keep the paper accessible to risk management practice, we choose to work with metrics on the set of random vectors.
Another alternative formulation would be to require all (instead of one) g X ∈ G X (ρ) to satisfy that Z → ρ(g X (Z)) is π-continuous at Z = X. This requirement would be stronger than the current Definition 2. Since a main message of this paper (Theorem 1) is that VaR is generally not robust, the current formulation in Definition 2 yields a stronger argument, as the requirement for robustness is weaker than the above alternative.
General relations between robustness and continuity
Clearly, the robustness of ρ relies on both some continuity of ρ on G(Z) and some continuity of functions in G X (ρ). In particular, if G X (ρ) = ∅, then ρ is not robust by definition. In what follows, we give a few general results where G X (ρ) contains a continuous function. However, later we will see that in many practical problems, G X (ρ) does not have any continuous elements for commonly used risk measures such as the Value-at-Risk and the Expected Shortfall; their robustness properties will be investigated in detail in Sections 5 and 6.
For a bijection g ∈ G n and a pseudo-metric space (Z, π) of n-dimensional random vectors, let (g(Z), π g ) be another pseudo-metric space defined as
Proposition 1. Suppose that for an uncertainty triplet (G, Z, π), X ∈ Z and a compatible objective functional ρ, G X (ρ) contains a bijection g, and ρ is π g -continuous on g(Z). Then ρ is robust at X relative to (G, Z, π).
Next we look at the basic settings of Z = L ∞ n , Z = L q n , and Z = L 0 n , equipped with the L ∞ metric π ∞ n in (3), the L q metric π q n in (4), and the pseudo-metric π W n in (5), respectively.
Proposition 2. Let ρ be a compatible objective functional for the uncertainty triplet (G, Z, π) and X ∈ Z.
(i) Suppose (Z, π) = (L ∞ n , π ∞ n ). If G X (ρ) contains a continuous function g : R n → R and ρ is π ∞ 1 -continuous, then ρ is robust at X relative to (G, Z, π).
(ii) Suppose (Z, π) = (L q n , π q n ), q ∈ [1, ∞). If G X (ρ) contains a continuous and linearly growing 4 function g : R n → R and ρ is π q 1 -continuous, then ρ is robust at X relative to (G, Z, π).
Proposition 2 provides simple criteria for verifying robustness of some objective functionals based on continuity of the optimizing functions in G X (ρ). As we shall see in Sections 4-6, for the popular risk measures VaR and ES, such criteria may not be very useful, as typically the optimizing functions lack the corresponding continuity. More detailed analyses are needed to draw meaningful conclusions for such objectives.
Representative optimization problems
As mentioned before, the robustness in optimization is a property of a functional, depending on an uncertainty triplet. Therefore, in order to study the robustness of certain functionals, we need to specify the functional as well as the optimization problem and the corresponding uncertainty model.
Our main interest is in the risk measures Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES).
Here, a positive value of Y represents a loss and a negative value represents a gain. The VaR at confidence level p ∈ (0, 1) is defined as
For any p ∈ (0, 1), we summarize some well known robustness properties of VaR p and ES p below.
1.) VaR p is continuous with respect to convergence in distribution (and hence, (Wasserstein)
at X if and only if the inverse cdf of X is continuous at p;
see, e.g., Proposition 7.3.1 in Shorack (2000) .
2.) It follows immediately from 1.) and (9) that ES p is continuous with respect to convergence in distribution on every uniformly integrable subset of L 1 . In particular, ES p is continuous
On the other hand, ES p is not continuous with respect to convergence in distribution on any set containing L ∞ + .
We concentrate on some simple optimization problems, which highlight the fundamental differences between the two risk measures above. Let n = 1 and X be a random loss. Suppose that random losses can be traded on a financial market with pricing density γ. By holding a risky position g(X), one receives the monetary amount E[γg(X)]. Let x 0 represent the budget of the investor, then the optimization problem is taken over the functions g satisfying the budget
We consider the following three classic setups of optimization problems in a financial market.
Recall that our optimization problem is to minimize ρ(g(X)) subject to g ∈ G, for some G ⊂ G 1 .
(a) An optimal investment or hedging problem in the case of a complete market:
The problem of optimal investing or hedging with a no short-selling or over-hedging constraint:
In this problem, we assume 0 x 0 < E[γX] to avoid triviality.
(c) The problem of optimal investing or hedging with a bounded constraint: for some m > 0,
In this problem, we assume 0 x 0 < m to avoid triviality.
Note that Problem (c) cannot be treated as a special case of Problem (b) as X in Problem (b) not only serves as the constraint but also as the source of randomness in the optimized position g(X).
We make the following assumptions on X, γ and our choice of the uncertainty (Z, π).
Assumption A (Global assumptions on optimization problems).
1. X ∈ Z, X 0 and the distribution of X is has a positive density on its support.
2. The pricing density γ = γ(X) > 0 is a continuous and strictly positive function of X,
The assumptions for X and γ are standard; for instance, they are satisfied by the classic Black-Scholes model of a single asset with terminal price X. Recall that X represents the source of randomness and hence γ is naturally a measurable function of X. We will use the notation γ for both the random variable γ(X) and the function γ : R → R. Assumption A will be imposed throughout the rest of the paper, and we do not specify X and (Z, π) unless necessary.
Optimization of Value-at-Risk
In this section we discuss the robustness properties of VaR p , p ∈ (0, 1), with respect to the three optimizations problems (a)-(c). From the results obtained, we shall see that VaR is generally not robust for these optimization problems. Recall that by the definition of robustness (Definition 2), in order to show such non-robustness, we have to identify all possible forms of the optimizing positions. We present the solutions to the optimization problems in Section 5.1 and then our conclusions on the robustness properties in Section 5.2.
Solutions to optimization problems
We first look at Problem (a) for VaR p , that is,
It turns out that a VaR is not robust for any choice of (Z, π) since the optimization problem (10) does not have a solution.
Proposition 3. VaR p (X; G cm ) = −∞. Hence, Problem (10) admits no solution.
Next, we turn toward solving Problem (b) for VaR p , that is,
where 0 x 0 < E[γX]. The optimization problem (11) is non-trivial to solve but fortunately it admits explicit solutions as we will see below. In what follows, let
Obviously, q 0 since g(X) is non-negative.
For this problem, an optimal solution always exists (see Lemma 1 in Appendix A.2). We summarize the solutions in the following proposition. Two cases are distinguished. If q = 0, the risk can be completely hedged under the criterion of VaR p . In this case, the solution of Problem (11) is generally not unique. This case is arguably less relevant, since there is no risk left according to VaR p after optimization. In the more interesting case q > 0, we identify the form of all possible solutions to Problem (11).
Before we proceed, we introduce the notion of a uniform transform U of a random variable Y , which is a uniform [0, 1] random variable such that F −1
, t ∈ (0, 1). For an atomless probability space, the existence of a uniform transform of any Y is guaranteed. See e.g. Lemma A.32 of Föllmer and Schied (2016) . (ii) If q = 0, a solution of Problem (11) is given by
(iii) If q > 0, any solution to Problem (11) has the form
The random variable U in the preceding proposition is defined on the probability space (Ω, σ(X), P). It can therefore be represented as a function of X, and so the random variables on the right-hand sides of (12) and (13) are indeed functions of X. To represent these functions in a more explicit form, we require the following (very weak) continuity assumption, which holds in particular if (X − q)γ has a continuous distribution, which is in turn the case if γ is an increasing function.
Assumption V1. q > 0 and P((X − q)γ VaR p ((X − q)γ)) = p.
Under Assumption V1, we immediately obtain {U > p} = {(X − q)γ > VaR p ((X − q)γ)} a.s.; we thus obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Under Assumption V1, Problem (11) admits a P-a.s. unique solution that is of the form
where c = VaR p ((X − q)γ). Finally, we turn to Problem (c) for VaR p , that is,
where 0
x 0 < m. The optimization problem (15) is studied by He and Zhou (2011) and it admits a simple solution, which we briefly present below. In what follows, similarly to Section 5.2, let
Similarly to Problem (b), we present solutions of Problem (c) in the cases q ′ = 0 and q ′ > 0 separately.
Proposition 5. Let U be a uniform transform of γ on the probability space (Ω, σ(X), P). (ii) If q ′ = 0, a solution of Problem (15) is given by
(iii) If q ′ > 0, any solution to Problem (15) has the form g X (X) = m1 {U>p} + q ′ 1 {U p} , a.s.
In order to establish the unique form of the optimizing functions for Problem (15), we make the following assumption which is analogous to Assumption V1.
Assumption V2. q ′ > 0 and P(γ VaR p (γ)) = p.
Corollary 2. Under Assumption V2, Problem (15) admits a P-a.s. unique solution that is of the form
where c = VaR p (γ).
Robustness of VaR in optimization
Now, we have gathered enough ingredients to establish the (non-)robustness of VaR. In the following theorem, (Z, π) is any one of the choices specified in Assumption A. The proof of this theorem involves some additional results which are given in Appendix A.2.
Theorem 1. For p ∈ (0, 1) and X ∈ Z, (i) VaR p is not robust at X relative to (G cm , Z, π);
(ii) under Assumption V1, VaR p is not robust at X relative to (G ns , Z, π);
(iii) under Assumption V2, VaR p is not robust at X relative to (G bd , Z, π).
Theorem 1 implies that, for all three settings of optimization problems and all choices of commonly used (pseudo-)metrics, VaR p is not robust, and this result holds for a general continuously distributed random variable X. As a consequence, VaR p has the poorest possible robustness in the context of optimization. This can already be seen from the form of its optimizing functions: the optimizing functions g X always have a jump at a p-quantile of g X (X), which makes it most vulnerable to model uncertainty.
Optimization of Expected Shortfall
In this section we discuss the robustness properties of ES p , p ∈ (0, 1), with respect to the three optimizations problems (a)-(c). From the results obtained, we shall see that ES is generally robust for these optimization problems, in sharp contrast to the case of VaR. Problems (a)-(c) are technically completely different for the two choices of risk measures. In order to show robustness of ES, we only need to specify a specific optimizing function and then show its corresponding continuity. Similarly to the organization of the previous section, we present the solutions to the optimization problems in Section 6.1 and then our conclusion on robustness in Section 6.2.
Recall again that Assumption A is imposed throughout this section.
Solutions to optimization problems
We first study Problem (a) for ES p , where 0 < p < 1, that is,
Our first result states that Problem (17) either does not have a solution or has a trivial solution.
The following condition on the essential supremum γ turns out to be crucial for Problem (17).
Assumption E1. ess-supγ Assumption E1 holds, a solution is given by g X (·) = x 0 .
If Assumption E1 holds, the solution to Problem (17) is a constant function g X (·) = x 0 , which corresponds to perfect hedging of the original financial position X (e.g. through purchase of an insurance cover). Since the risk is perfectly hedged, there is no model uncertainty in the optimized position anymore.
Next, we turn toward solving Problem (b) for ES p , where 0 < p < 1, that is, to minimize ES p (g(X)) subject to g ∈ G 1 : E[γg(X)] x 0 , 0 g(X) X,
where 0 x 0 < E[γX]. Based on Theorem 8.26 of Föllmer and Schied (2016) , which is a slight generalization of a result by Sekine (2004) , the form of an optimized position is obtained explicitly in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. There exist constants c > 0, r 0, and λ ∈ [0, 1] such that the function
solves Problem (18). Moreover, r is a p-quantile of g X (X).
Finally, we turn to Problem (c) for ES p , where 0 < p < 1, that is, to minimize ES p (g(X)) subject to g ∈ G 1 : E[γg(X)] x 0 , 0 g(X) m,
where 0 x 0 < m. The solution to this problem is similar to the case of Problem (18).
Proposition 8. There exist constants c > 0, r ∈ [0, m], and λ ∈ [r, m] such that the function
solves Problem (20). Moreover, r is a p-quantile of g X (X).
Let us now comment on some possible re-formulations of our optimization problems (17), (18), and (20).
Remark 5. Consider the following general version of problems (17), (18), and (20), in which risk profiles of the form g(X) are replaced by general F -measurable random variables: (22). But every σ(X)-measurable functional is of the form g(X) for some function g, and so there must exist a function g X ∈ G 1 satisfying the constraints in (18), such that E[Y * |X] = g X (X) is a solution of both (22) and the corresponding problem (17), (18), or (20).
This shows that the problem (22) is not much more general than our representative optimization problems. The same argument works for every law-invariant convex risk measure in place of ES p .
Remark 6. Our representative optimization problems (17), (18), and (20) connect as follows with continuous-time optimal hedging problems in a complete market with an arbitrary number of primary assets. For instance, suppose that S = (S t ) t∈[0,T ] is a d-dimensional semimartingale admitting a unique local martingale measure Q with density γ = dQ/dP on F = F S T . We can interpret S as the discounted price process of d risky securities. The fact that Q is unique is equivalent to the completeness of the model. In this context, it is a natural task to minimize, e.g.,
where is a V T is the discounted time-T value of a self-financing trading strategy satisfying a cost constraint on the initial investment V 0 and also certain other constraints such as 0 V T X. By martingale arguments, the initial investment satisfies V 0 = E[γV T ]. So, by letting Y := X − V T , we are in the context of the general optimization problem (22). On the other hand, market completeness implies that S has the martingale representation property, and so every feasible functional Y can be represented in the form X − V T , where V is again the value process of some self-financing trading strategy. With Remark 5, we thus conclude that our representative optimization problems comprise corresponding problems of optimizing over multi-dimensional dynamic hedging strategies as a special case. In this context, our solution function g X may be interpreted as the payoff of a digital or gap option due to a jump in its graph, which can be replicated through a continuously-adjusted trading strategy in the assets S 1 , . . . , S d .
Robustness of ES in optimization
To establish the robustness of ES in optimization, we make the following regularity assumption, which is satisfied by essentially all practical models of financial markets with continuous model space.
Assumption E2. Either γ is a constant, or γ is a continuous function and γ(X) is continuously distributed.
Theorem 2. For p ∈ (0, 1) and X ∈ Z, (i) under Assumption E1, ES p is robust at X relative to (G cm , Z, π);
(ii) under Assumption E2, ES p is robust at X relative to (G ns , Z, π) for (Z, π) = (L q , π q 1 ), q ∈ [1, ∞];
(iii) under Assumption E2, ES p is robust at X relative to (G bd , Z, π).
Comparing Theorems 1 and 2, ES has advantages over VaR in terms of robustness for all the settings of Problems (a)-(c). In particular, the optimized positions for ES in the settings of Problems (b)-(c) are non-trivial but they have much better continuity than the corresponding optimized positions for VaR. Note that Assumptions V1, V2 and E2 impose some continuity properties on the underlying random variables. These are realistic for most practical models.
Remark 7. Generally, ES p is not robust at X relative to (G ns , Z, π W 1 ) for a set Z that is not uniformly integrable, and this is due to the fact that ES p is not continuous with respect to π W 1 , as mentioned in Section 4. On the other hand, if Z is uniformly integrable, then ES p is robust at X relative to (G ns , Z, π W 1 ) under Assumption E2, using the same proof as in Theorem 2.
7 Implications for regulatory risk measures There are extensive discussions on the robustness of VaR and ES (although not in the context of optimization of this paper), and it may be fair to keep a balanced view. One important issue on the robustness of ES is the difficulty arising from perturbations which yield probability distributions that may have infinite first moment; this is why in our analysis, ES is not robust with respect to optimization when the perturbation (uncertainty) to the underlying probability model is measured by the Prokhorov metric π P . Therefore, in the minimization of ES from historical data, one needs to always make suitable integrability assumptions, or otherwise minimizing ES may be as problematic as the case of VaR. Infinite mean models are not of a purely academic nature in risk management; see for instance Nešlehová et al. (2006) For recent academic discussions on various issues related to the desirability of VaR and ES in banking and insurance regulation, we refer to Kou and Peng (2016) , Fissler and Ziegel (2016) , Embrechts et al. (2018) , Armstrong and Brigo (2018) and the references therein.
Our framework can certainly be applied to other settings such as other risk measures (e.g., distortion risk measures) or expected utility/loss functions, and other settings of optimization problems. However, due to our main interest in the comparative properties of risk measures, we confine our present study to the most practical cases of VaR and ES, and several representative optimization problems. Certainly, there are many future directions to explore on robustness issues in optimization.
8 Is distributionally robust optimization robust?
We conclude this paper by discussing our notion of robustness in the context of distributionally robust optimization. The results in Sections 5-6 show that VaR is generally not robust for the optimization problems (a)-(c). In a classic setting of distributionally robust optimization (e.g. Quaranta and Zaffaroni (2008) , Zhu and Fukushima (2009) , Blanchet and Murthy (2018) ), the objective functional itself is evaluated under the worst-case value over a set of possible models representing uncertainty. By taking the worst-case value of the objective, model uncertainty is naturally incorporated into the optimization problem. One naturally wonders whether the robustness properties of risk measures would be improved with such an approach.
To formulate this consideration mathematically, let ρ be a compatible objective functional for an uncertainty triplet (G, Z, π) and X ∈ Z. We look at the following optimization problem, which is a robust version of (1),
where ε > 0. Denote by G X (ρ, ε) the set of functions g ∈ G minimizing (23). Clearly, if we allow ε = 0 in (23), then G X (ρ, 0) = G X (ρ) and we are back in the setting of Section 2. In the problem (23), an investor is interested in the risk measure value ρ(g(Z)) of the risky position g(Z), in which Z is the unknowable true model. Therefore, similarly to Definition 2, we say that the objective functional ρ is robust for the setting (23) if there exists g ∈ G X (ρ, ε) such that the function Z → ρ(g(Z)) is π-continuous at Z = X.
Unfortunately, the minimax problem (23) is not easy to solve analytically, even for the representative settings in Section 4 and in the cases of VaR and ES. Typically, a linear programming approach has to be applied for such problems. As ES p is already shown to be generally robust in Section 6, its distributionally robust version is also generally robust; we thus focus on the question of whether VaR p becomes more robust in this context.
In order to obtain analytic results, we look at a simple setting of Problem (c). Letting (G, Z, π) = (G bd , L ∞ , π ∞ 1 ), we can formulate the problem to minimize: sup
where 0 x 0 < m. Similarly to Section 5, let
In addition to Assumption A in Section 4, we make the following assumption, which can be seen as a stronger version of Assumption V2.
Assumption V3. q > 0, 1/2 p < 1, X has a decreasing density on its support and γ is an increasing function of X 6 .
Fortunately, with Assumption V3, we are able to obtain an explicit form of the solution to Problem (24), allowing us to compare the corresponding robustness property with the results we obtained in Section 5.
Proposition 9. Under Assumption V3, Problem (24) admits a solution of the form
With the solution g X in Proposition 9, the continuity of VaR mentioned in Section 4 implies that the mapping Z → VaR p (g X (Z)) is π ∞ 1 -continuous at Z = X. As a consequence, VaR p is robust for the setting (23). This observation is in sharp contrast with Theorem 1, where we see that VaR p is not robust relative to (G bd , L ∞ , π ∞ 1 ) under some weak assumptions. Therefore, at least for the above illustrative example, the modified optimization problem (24) improves the robustness of VaR. It is unclear how this result can be generalized to other optimization problems, as analytic results for (23) are rarely available.
Although VaR p becomes robust in the setting (24), its optimizing function takes a similar form as in Proposition 5, that is, a bi-atomic distribution which results in a big loss with small probability. Note that if ε approaches to zero, then the above solution g X converges to the solution in Proposition 5. This type of optimizing functions is highly undesirable and is subject to considerable model uncertainty if ε is small; see the discussions in Section 7.
A Proofs of theorems and propositions A.1 Proofs in Section 3
Proof of Proposition 1. It suffices to show that the function Z → ρ(g(Z)) is π-continuous. By definition, for any X, Y ∈ Z, π g(Z) (g(X), g(Y )) = π(X, Y ). Thus the π g(Z) -continuity of ρ is equivalent to the π-continuity of the function Z → ρ(g(Z)). 6 The monotonicity of γ as a function of X has a simple economic meaning. Recall that X represents the loss of an asset. Hence, Assumption V3 requires that the pricing density is larger when the asset has a larger loss. This requirement is satisfied by classic equilibrium models in the notion of Arrow-Debreu (Arrow and Debreu (1954) ).
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) It suffices to show that, as k → ∞, X k → X in π ∞ n implies that g(X k ) → g(X) in π ∞ 1 . This is a direct consequence of the Heine-Cantor Theorem (see Theorem 4.19 of Rudin (1976) ).
(ii) X k → X w.r.t. π q n implies that {|X k | q } k∈N is uniformly integrable and that X k → X in probability. It follows from the Continuous Mapping Theorem that g(X k ) → g(X) in probability. Moreover, for sufficiently large c,
Therefore, (|g(X k )| q ) is uniformly integrable and, in turn, g(X k ) → g(X) w.r.t. π q 1 .
(iii) It suffices to show that, as k → ∞, X k → X in π W n implies that g(X k ) → g(X) in π W 1 . This is a direct consequence of the Continuous Mapping Theorem.
A.2 Proofs in Section 5
Proof of Proposition 3. Note that we assumed that X is continuously distributed. Let y = VaR p (X). We have P(X
On the other hand, VaR p (g d (X)) = d. Letting d → −∞, VaR p (X; G cm ) = inf{ρ(VaR p (g(X)) : g ∈ G cm } = −∞, and hence (10) does not have an optimizer.
We first verify that Problem (11) always has a solution in the following lemma. This lemma will be used later in the proofs of Proposition 4 and Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. Problem (11) admits at least one solution, and VaR p (X) > q.
Proof of Lemma 1. Define Q through dQ/dP = γ and let µ = Q • X −1 . The set G ns is then a uniformly integrable subset of L 1 (µ). Let {g n } n∈N be a minimizing sequence for VaR p in G ns . By the Dunford-Pettis and Eberlein-Šmulian theorems (Theorems IV.8.9 and V.6.1 of Dunford and Schwartz (1958) ), there exists a subsequence {g n k } k∈N that converges weakly in L 1 (µ) to some function g X ∈ L 1 (µ). Since G ns is convex and closed in L 1 (µ), we get g X ∈ G ns .
Moreover, weak convergence in L 1 (µ) implies clearly that the laws of g n k (X) converge weakly to the one of g X (X). But VaR p is a left-hand quantile and hence lower semicontinuous with respect to weak convergence (see, e.g., Exercise A.6.1 in Föllmer and Schied (2016) ). This proves that g X is optimal.
Note that VaR p (X) > 0 since X 0 is continuously distributed. Let y = (E[γX] −
x 0 )/E[γX] and g(X) = (X − y) + . It is clear that
Therefore, g ∈ G ns . By the invariance of VaR p under monotone transformations,
Thus, q < VaR p (X).
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) ⇐: Let U be a uniform transform of γX on the atomless probability space (Ω, σ(X), P). Take g(X) = X1 {U>p} which is σ(X)-measurable. Then E[γg(X)] = (1 − p)ES p (γX) x 0 . Therefore, g ∈ G ns and 0 q VaR p (g(X)) = 0.
⇒: Suppose q = 0. Then, by Lemma 1, there exists g X ∈ G ns such that VaR p (g X (X)) = 0.
This implies P(γg X (X) > 0) P(g X (X) > 0) 1 − p, which, in turn, implies
VaR p (γg X (X)) = 0. Therefore,
The result follows.
(ii) This has been seen in (i).
(iii) We give the complete proof in Lemma 2, where the desired result is stated as part (v).
Lemma 2. Let g X be a solution to Problem (11) . Assuming q > 0, the following hold.
(i) E[γg X (X)] = x 0 , that is, the budget constraint is binding.
(ii) If g ∈ G ns has the form g(X) = X1 A + (X ∧ q)1 A c for some A ∈ F with P(A) = 1 − p, then g is a solution to Problem (11).
(iii) g X (X) = X1 A + (X ∧ q)1 A c a.s. for some A ∈ σ(X) with P(A) = 1 − p.
(iv) The solutions to the problem
are A * = {U > p} a.s. where U is a uniform transform of (X − q)γ on the probability space (Ω, σ(X), P).
(v) g X (X) = X1 A * + (X ∧ q)1 (A * ) c for some A * given in part (iv).
Proof. (i) Suppose that E[γg X (X)] > x 0 , then there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that λg X ∈ G ns and VaR p (λg X (X)) = λVaR p (g X (X)) < VaR p (g X (X)), a contradiction.
(ii) Clearly, P(g(X) > q) 1 − p and hence VaR p (g(X)) q. Therefore, g is a solution to Problem (11).
(iii) First, note that for any random variable Y , one can write
From there, we can write g X (X) = g X (X)1 A + g X (X)1 A c , with P(A) = 1 − p and g X (X) VaR p (g X (X)) = q on A c . Since X is continuously distributed, A can be chosen as a set in σ(X). Let g(X) = X1 A +(X∧q)1 A c .
Clearly, g(X) g X (X) a.s. Moreover, from part (ii), g is a solution to (11). From part
Together with g(X) g X (X) a.s., we have g(X) = g X (X) a.s.
(iv) Note that we can rewrite the objective in (26) as
Therefore, to solve Problem (26) (v) From part (iii), we know g X (X) = X1 A + (X ∧ q)1 A c a.s. for some A ∈ σ(X) with
where A * is given in part (iv). By part (iv), E[γg(X)] E[γg X (X)] = x 0 . Hence, g ∈ G ns , and using part (ii), we know that g is a solution to (11). Furthermore, using part (i), E[γg(X)] = x 0 = E[γg X (X)]. Since E[γg(X)] = E[γg X (X)], by part (iv) again, A maximizes the objective in Problem (26).
Therefore, A = A * and g(X) = g X (X) a.s.
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) This follows from the same proof of Proposition 4 (i).
(ii) It can be easily checked that VaR p (g X (X)) = 0 and g X ∈ G bd .
(iii) The proof is similar to that of Proposition 4 (iii).
To show Theorem 1, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let φ : R → R be a measurable function and a ∈ R such that P(φ(X) a) = p ∈ (0, 1). There exists a sequence {Z n } n∈N ⊂ Z such that the distribution measure of Z n is absolutely continuous with respect to that of X, Z n → X in π, and P(φ(Z n ) a) < p.
Proof. Let R be the range of X and B = {x ∈ R : φ(x) > a}. Note that B = R since P(X ∈ B) = 1 − p < 1. Fix ε > 0.
(i) Assume that there exists a uniform random variable U ε on [−ε, ε] and independent of X.
Let
By Assumption A, X is has positive density over R, and X ε also has density over R. Hence, the distribution measure of X ε is absolutely continuous with respect to that of X. It is easy to see that |X ε − X| ε, and
(ii) If there does not exist a uniform random variable independent of X, we extend the original probability space to allow for such a random variable, and define X ε via (27). Then, we defineX ε = F −1 Xε (F X (X)) where F −1 Xε is the quantile function of X ε . NowX ε is well defined in the probability space (Ω, F , P). By the facts that, || · || ∞ is monotone in convex order, andX ε − X is smaller than X ε − X in convex order (see e.g. Corollary 3.28 of Rüschendorf (2013)), we have
In either cases (i) or (ii), taking Z n = X 1/n , n ∈ N, we complete the proof of the lemma for the metric π = π ∞ 1 , which is the strongest metric among choices specified in Assumption A. Therefore, the lemma holds for all choices of (Z, π) in Assumption A.
Proof of Theorem 1. (i) This statement follows directly from Proposition 3.
(ii) Let µ X be the distribution measure of X and c = VaR p ((X − q)γ). First, we verify c > 0.
Note that if c 0, then Assumption V1 would imply P(X − q 0) p, which, together with q < VaR p (X), conflicts the density assumption of X in Assumption A. Hence, c > 0.
Consider the set
Since γ is a continuous function, it is locally bounded at q, which means that there exists ε > 0 such that A ⊂ [q + ε, ∞).
By Lemma 3, there exists a non-negative sequence of random variables in Z, Z n → X in π, such that Z n has a distribution measure absolutely continuous with respect to µ X , and P(γ(Z n )(Z n − q) > c) = P(Z n ∈ A) > 1 − p. Since Z n q + ε if Z n ∈ A, and P(Z n ∈ A) > 1 − p, we have VaR p (Z n 1 {Zn∈A} ) q + ε.
For g X ∈ G ns (X, VaR p ), from Corollary 1 we know
We have g X (Z n ) = Z n 1 {γ(Zn)(Zn−q)>c} + (Z n ∧ q)1 {γ(Zn)(Zn−q) c} a.s.
It follows that
so that the mapping Z → VaR p (g X (Z)) is not continuous at Z = X with respect to π ∞ 1 .
(iii) This case similar to (ii) but slightly simpler. Let c = VaR p (γ). Note that q < m since E[γg X (X)] = x 0 < m (see Lemma 2 (i)). By Lemma 3, there exists a non-negative sequence of random variables in Z, Z n → X in π, such that P(γ(Z n ) > c) > 1 − p. Therefore, VaR p (m1 {γ(Zn)>c} ) = m. For g X ∈ G ns (X, VaR p ), from Corollary 2 we know
where µ X is the distribution measure of X. Since Z n has a distribution measure absolutely continuous with respect to µ X , we have g X (Z n ) = m1 {γ(Zn)>c} + q1 {γ(Zn) c} a.s.
Noting that VaR p (g X (X)) = q < m, we have
A.3 Proofs in Section 6
Proof of Proposition 6. , and hence for any g ∈ G cm , ES p (g(X)) E[γg(X)] x 0 . Clearly, taking the constant function g X (·) = x 0 we have g X ∈ G cm and ES p (g X (X)) = x 0 . Therefore, g X is a solution to Problem (17).
For λ > 0, take g λ (x) = λ1 {γ(x)> 1 1−p } −λy+x 0 , x ∈ R. It is clear that E[γg λ (X)] = λy−λy+x 0 = x 0 , and hence g λ ∈ G cm . We can calculate
Letting λ → ∞, we get
and hence there is no solution to Problem (17).
Proof of Proposition 7. The result follows from Theorem 8.26 of Föllmer and Schied (2016) . The fact that r is a p-quantile of g X (X) is stated in the proof of Theorem 8.26 in Föllmer and Schied (2016) .
Proof of Proposition 8. Similarly to Proposition 7, the result follows from Theorem 8.26 of Föllmer and Schied (2016) .
Proof of Theorem 2. (i) Since an optimal allocation is a constant function, it is not subject to any model uncertainty, that is, g(Z) = g(X) for all Z ∈ Z.
(ii) It suffices to show the statement for (Z, π) = (L 1 , π 1 1 ) since the statement for (Z, π) = (L q , π q 1 ) for q ∈ (1, ∞] is weaker. Let {Z n } n∈N ⊂ L 1 be a sequence of random variable such that Z n → X in L 1 . We will show g X (Z n ) → g X (X) in L 1 for some g X which optimizes (18).
(1) Assume γ is constant. By Proposition 7, for some r 0 and λ ∈ [0, 1], the function
solves (18). Clearly, g X (Z n ) → g X (X) in L 1 .
(2) Assume γ is a continuous function and γ(X) is continuously distributed. Let g X be given by (18) Since γ(X) is continuously distributed, P(γ(X) ∈ [c − δ, c + δ]) can be made arbitrarily small. Therefore, 1 {γ(Zn)<c} → 1 {γ(X)<c} in probability. Similarly, 1 {γ(Zn)>c} → 1 {γ(X)>c} in probability. As a consequence, g X (Z n ) → g X (X) in probability. Also note that the L 1 -convergence Z n → X implies that {Z n } n∈N is uniformly integrable.
Because 0 g X (Z n ) Z n , {g X (Z n )} n∈N is also uniformly integrable, and hence it converges to g X (X) in L 1 .
Finally, noting that ES p is continuous with respect to π 1 1 (see Section 4), we have g X (Z n ) → g X (X) as n → ∞. Thus, ES p is robust at X relative to (G ns , L 1 , π 1 1 ). As explained before, this also implies that ES p is robust at X relative to (G ns , L q , π q 1 ), q ∈ (1, ∞].
(iii) To show the statement for π = π W 1 , it suffices to take a sequence {Z n } n∈N which converges to X in probability. Note that the sequence {g X (Z n )} n∈N is uniformly bounded. The rest follows by the same proof of (ii).
A.4 Proofs in Section 8
To prove Proposition 9, we need the following two lemmas. In what follows, we denote by A ε = {x ∈ R : |x − y| ε for some y ∈ A} for a set A ⊂ R and ε > 0.
Lemma 4. If A ⊂ R is either compact or an interval, then A ε ∈ B(R) and sup π ∞ 1 (Y,X) ε measurable). In the case in which A is a nondegenerate interval, we fix a point a in the interior of the interval and let
In both cases, |Y − X| ε, and P(Y ∈ A) = P(X ∈ A ε ), leading to the desired result.
Lemma 5. Let ε > 0, p ∈ [1/2, 1), and suppose that X satisfies Assumption V3. If A ⊂ R is a compact set or an interval satisfying sup π ∞ 1 (Y,X) ε P(Y ∈ A) 1 − p, then P(X > VaR p (X) + ε) P(X ∈ A).
Proof. By letting A * = (VaR p (X)+ε, ∞), the assertion can be rewritten as P(X ∈ A * ) P(X ∈ A). By Lemma 4, we have 1 − p = P(X ∈ A * ε ) = sup
If P(X ∈ A ε ) < 1 − p, we can enlarge A to obtain P(X ∈ A ε ) = 1 − p. Then x := inf(A ε ) satisfies
x VaR p (X) since P(X x) 1 − P(X ∈ A ε ) = p.
We consider two cases separately. First, we assume x > ess-infX. It is from the definition of x that inf(A) = x + ε. Hence, (x, x + ε) ⊂ A ε \ A. Also note that P(X ∈ (x, x + ε)) P(X ∈ (VaR p (X), VaR p (X) + ε)) since X has a decreasing density and x VaR p (X). Therefore, we have P(X ∈ A) = P(X ∈ A ε ) − P(X ∈ A ε \ A) 1 − p − P(X ∈ (x, x + ε)) 1 − p − P(X ∈ (VaR p (X), VaR p (X) + ε)) = P(X ∈ A * ).
Next, we assume x ess-infX. Since p ∈ [1/2, 1), we have P(X < VaR p (X) + ε)) > p 1 − p.
Because P(X ∈ A ε ) = 1 − p and x ess-infX, there exists x 0 ∈ (x, VaR p + ε) such that x 0 ∈ A ε . Let x 1 = sup{y < x 0 : y ∈ A ε }. By the definition of A ε and x 1 , we have x 1 − ε > x and (x 1 − ε, x 1 ) ⊂ A ε \ A. Using a similar argument as in the first case, we have P(X ∈ A) = P(X ∈ A ε ) − P(X ∈ A ε \ A) 1 − p − P(X ∈ (x 1 − ε, x 1 )) 1 − p − P(X ∈ (VaR p (X), VaR p (X) + ε)) = P(X ∈ A * ).
We conclude that, in both cases, P(X ∈ A * ) P(X ∈ A).
Proof of Proposition 9. Take an arbitrary g ∈ G bd and let a = sup π ∞ 1 (Y,X) ε VaR p (g(Y )). Let h be given by
For all Y ∈ L ∞ with π ∞ 1 (Y, X) ε, we have VaR p (g(Y )) a. Therefore, P(g(Y ) > a) 1 − p, which implies VaR p (h(Y )) a. Thus, sup π ∞ 1 (Y,X) ε
VaR p (h(Y )) = a.
Note that h ∈ G bd since m h(x) g(x) 0, x ∈ R. Therefore, for any g ∈ G bd , we can find some h ∈ G bd of the form (31), such that
VaR p (g(Y )).
As a consequence, it suffices to search for optimizers h ∈ G bd of the form (31). Moreover, for such an h, we have E[γh(X)] = mQ(g(X) > a) + aQ(g(X) a), where Q is given by dQ/dP = γ.
Due to the inner regularity of the law Q • X −1 , we can find, for any a ′ > a, a compact set
Let us denote by K the class of all compact set K ⊂ R satisfying P(Y ∈ K) 1 − p for all Y ∈ L ∞ with π ∞ 1 (Y, X) ε. The above argument shows that K is not empty. Define a function
where a K ∈ R is such that E[γh K (X)] = x 0 . The existence of a K is guaranteed by P(X ∈ K c ) p > 0. Note that 0 < a K < m since x 0 < m and q > 0.
The preceding argument shows that it is sufficient to construct a function h * such that E[γh * (X)] = x 0 and sup π ∞ 1 (Y,X) ε
for all K ∈ K . We define h * by
where a * m is such that E[γh * (X)] = x 0 . Now let K ∈ K be given and h K of the form (32).
We take k ∈ R such that P(X > k) = P(X ∈ K). Lemma 5 gives P(X > c + ε) P(X ∈ K) = P(X > k) and hence k c + ε. Moreover, since γ is an increasing function of X, the upper Hardy-Littlewood inequality, in the form of Föllmer and Schied (2016, Theorem A.28) , yields
Our condition E[γh * (X)] = x 0 therefore yields a K a * . Since, moreover, by construction, sup π ∞ 1 (Y,X) ε
VaR p (h * (Y )) = a * and sup
we conclude that (33) holds and that h * is hence a solution to Problem (24).
